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hypotheses of how rational expected utility-maximisers would behave as players in the
game and I test these hypotheses with the relevant choice data. The main result is that
an increasing o¤er function is the result of optimal behaviour when the banker is uncer-
tain about the contestants risk attitudes. This result provides a theoretical foundation
to the empirical model of the banker that pervades the literature. Estimates of the coef-
cient of relative risk aversion are consistent with estimates from other studies and esti-
mates of the discernment parameter suggest contestants have di¢ culty making choices.
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1 Introduction
"Deal or No Deal?" is a popular television game-show in which contestants make choices
between risky prospects in the hope of winning up to £ 250,0001. Unlike most game-shows,
the contestants winnings are not determined by his competence at some skill or his ability
to answer a set of testing general knowledge questions; "Deal or No Deal?" is a game of
pure risk and the size of the contestants winnings, which are potentially life-changing, is
ultimately down to luck. For this reason, it makes for a very interesting case study of how
individuals make decisions under risk.
I explain the rules of the game in detail in Section 2 but I give the basic idea of what
happens here. A contestant chooses a box which contains one of 22 known sums of money.
The sum contained in the box is unknown but we gain information about its value through
a process of elimination. In each round the contestant selects a certain number of the other
21 boxes to be opened and the contents of these boxes are revealed to give information
about what is not in the contestants box. At the end of each round the "banker" makes
the contestant an o¤er based on the sums that remain in play. If the contestant accepts the
o¤er he walks away with this sure sum and if he rejects the o¤er he moves to the next round
where he opens more boxes and faces another o¤er from the banker. The game goes on like
this until the contestant either accepts an o¤er or rejects all of the bankers o¤ers and takes
home the sum in his own box.
In this paper I analyse the game-show in a game-theoretical framework. Unlike previous
studies, I model both the contestant and the banker as strategic players in a dynamic game
and consider equilibrium strategy proles for both players. Given evidence of heterogeneity
in individualsrisk preferences I assert that, even with a fairly extensive screening process,
the banker may have noisy beliefs about the contestants preferences and I use this position
to derive the main result of this paper. Namely, I show that in the presence of uncertainty
about the contestants preferences, when both players are optimising, the bankers o¤er
becomes relatively more generous from round to round. This gives a theoretical basis to
empirical models of the banker which make such an assumption. Furthermore it shows
that one does not need a complex representation of the bankers preferences to explain an
increasing o¤er function but that it can be explained by optimising behaviour in the presence
of type uncertainty.
The increasing o¤er function allows the banker to update his beliefs about the contestants
risk preferences step by step and this helps the banker to minimise the expected payout over
1"Deal or No Deal?" was rst aired in Britain in October 2005 but it had previously been shown in similar
forms in the Netherlands, Australia and Italy and it is now a global franchise with shows in 49 countries
around the world. This paper focuses on the British version of the show.
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the rest of the game. Understanding that this is the case, contestants are able to appreciate
the value of staying in the game, being grouped with lower risk types and receiving a relatively
higher o¤er in the next round. Contestants therefore need to be paid more to reveal their
type and leave the game and o¤ers are overall higher than they would be under symmetric
information.
I estimate contestantspreferences using an empirical model which can be interpreted as
an approximation of the game-theoretical model. I use data from 129 episodes of "Deal or
No Deal?" aired in great Britain between October 2005 and April 2006 to estimate a random
e¤ects logit model in which the probability that the contestant plays deal depends on how
close the o¤er is to his threshold value and how "discerning" the contestant is. The estimate
of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion under the assumption of no wealth integration is
approximately 0.6 and there is evidence of heterogeneity in preferences. The estimate of the
discernment parameter suggests contestants have di¢ culty making choices, even when the
o¤ers are substantially di¤erent from the contestants threshold value. This conclusion is
strengthened by evidence from the bounds approach to the estimation of the contestants
preferences, which shows that at least 1 in 5 contestants make inconsistent choices during
the course of their game.
While it is noteworthy that the bankers preferences need not be any more complex than
the basic specication to produce an interesting o¤er function, it is unlikely that the o¤er is
not informed by other considerations. I discuss what these considerations may be and how
they may a¤ect the o¤er. For example, low o¤ers in the opening rounds ensure the game
lasts a few rounds, which is a necessary condition for an entertaining show. The possibility
that contestantschoices are characterised by non-EUT theories is mentioned but I do not
o¤er any formal analysis on this subject.
1.1 Related Literature
Game-shows can be useful case-studies for empirical estimates of risk attitudes because they
generate data on individualschoices in high-stakes gambles without incurring large costs to
the experimenter. Gertner (1993) was the rst to analyse choice under risk in a game-show
setting, using "Card Sharks" as the subject. Other studies that followed include Metrick
(1995) ("Jeopardy!"); Fullenkamp et al (2003) ("Hoosier Millionaire"); Bennett and Hickman
(1993), Berk et al (1996) and Tenorio and Cason (2002) ("The Price is Right"); and Beetsma
and Schotman (2001) ("Lingo").
Within the class of game-shows "Deal or No Deal?" stands out as a particularly attractive
source of data for the estimation of risk attitudes. There are a numerous possible gambles
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and the prizes range from as little as 1p to as much as £ 250,000. Furthermore, the game is
not burdened by complications such as the estimation of subjective beliefs. It is a game of
pure risk at each decision node the set of possible prizes and the associated probabilities
are public information and there is no requirement to perform well at a task or answer any
general knowledge questions. "Deal or No Deal?" therefore represents a new and rich source
of data for the estimation of individualsrisk attitudes.
The appealing format of the game-show has provoked interest among decision theorists,
resulting in the recent growth of a body of academic literature, most notably Bombardini
and Trebbi (2005), Post et al. (2006), De Roos and Saridis (2006) and Mulino et al (2006).
These studies generally set out to test Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and nd estimates
of individual risk coe¢ cients, but some also look at alternative theories of choice and make
comparisons with the EUT approach. For example, Post et al (2006) and Mulino et al
(2006) nd evidence that contestants behave in a manner consistent with a frame-dependent
theory of choice, such as Prospect Theory, and De Roos and Saridis (2006) estimate a
rank-dependent utility (RDU) model and nd that it considerably outperforms EUT.
Other studies look at specic aspects of the game to test theories of choice. For example,
Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) use data from the nal two rounds of the Italian version of
the show when the contestant has either a 20% chance or a 80% chance of winning a large
prize and nd evidence that contestants are not less risk-averse when facing large improbable
gains. In another paper, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006b) focus on the choice of a box swap
and nd that contestants generally do not display loss aversion in their decisions.
Estimates of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion vary according to the choice of wealth
parameter. De Roos and Saridis (2006) estimate it in the range of 0.45-0.66 when there
is no initial wealth, and 1.8-3.2 when initial wealth (approximated by the average annual
labour income) is included. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) use data from the Italian version
of the show and estimate the coe¢ cient of constant relative risk aversion for the sample at
1.09, using annual labour income as the measure of wealth (the estimate drops to 0.5 if one
assumes zero wealth). Thus they nd that logarithmic utility is a suitable representation of
contestantspreferences. They also nd that contestants are approximately risk-neutral at
small stakes, which, according to Rabins calibration theorem (Rabin, 2000), is necessary for
EUT to produce reasonable levels of risk-aversion at high stakes. These estimates compare
well with estimates from other game-show studies (e.g. Beetsma and Schotman (2001), Ful-
lenkamp et al (2003)) but are smaller than estimates from the broader eld, which generally
use nance data, (e.g. Blake (1996), Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Sydnor (2005)), although
there are some exceptions (e.g. Chetty (2006), which uses evidence of labour elasticities).
A major theme to come out of the literature is that there appears to be signicant het-
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erogeneity in individualsrisk attitudes. Post et al (2006, p17) nd that "the degree of risk
aversion di¤ers widely across the contestants", De Roos and Saridis (2006, p20) observe
"signicant variation in the degree of risk aversion" and Bombardini and Trebbi (2005, p23)
nd "substantial dispersion in risk preferences". Mulino et al (2006) also nd evidence of
considerable heterogeneity and single out age and gender as statistically signicant deter-
minants of the individuals risk aversion. Such ndings of heterogeneous risk attitudes are
consistent with ndings from other studies from the broader literature (e.g. Barsky et al
(1997), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) and Kliger and Levy (2002)).
If contestants are to have varying degrees of risk aversion then uncertainty about the
contestants type on the bankers part becomes a possibility. Moreover, even with a rigorous
screening process, the banker would nd it di¢ cult to develop pinpoint beliefs about an
individuals preferences. Thus such type uncertainty is likely. The assumption that the
banker is uncertain about the contestants preferences forms the basis of the formal analysis
in this paper and it is crucial in the derivation of the main result, which is that the bankers
equilibrium o¤er becomes relatively more generous with each round.
It has been suggested that EUTmay not be an appropriate framework to model individual
choices in the setting of this game-show (see above). I do not test alternative theories of
choice but o¤er an improvement to the EUT approach. I model the problem as a game
in which both the contestant and the banker are strategic players and in doing so I derive
stronger theoretical results to test with the data. EUT o¤ers itself well to be handled in
this way, but the same cannot be said for alternative theories, such as Prospect Theory. In
particular, Prospect Theory does not specify how to deal with multi-stage games and it does
not provide a formal theory of how individuals edit the prospects or determine their reference
points. As such the formal modelling in this paper is restricted to the EUT framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I explain the rules of the
game and in Section 3 I introduce the game-show data. In Section 4 I present an empirical
model of the banker and nd estimates of the contestantspreferences and the bankers o¤er
function. I then turn my attention to the construction of a complete model of the game
in Section 5, where I present the game of incomplete information and derive results for the
contestant and the banker under the assumption of optimising behaviour. I discuss possible
extensions to the Bankers preferences in Section 6 before closing with some conclusions in
Section 7.
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Table 1: The 22 hidden prizes
1p £ 1,000
10p £ 3,000
50p £ 5,000
£ 1 £ 10,000
£ 5 £ 15,000
£ 10 £ 20,000
£ 50 £ 35,000
£ 100 £ 50,000
£ 250 £ 75,000
£ 500 £ 100,000
£ 750 £ 250,000
2 The Rules of the Game
The rules of the game are straightforward. There are 22 individuals, whom I call the candi-
dates, and 22 sealed boxes. The contents of each box are unknown to all parties involved in
the game2, but it is known that each box contains one of the values from Table 1. All values
are included and none are repeated.
Before the show starts, each candidate chooses a box. Once this is done one of the
candidates is randomly chosen to compete as the contestant. The other 21 candidates stay
on the show, waiting to be called upon to reveal the contents of their box.
The game starts with round 1, and the contestant is asked to select 5 boxes from the
21 held by the non-competing candidates. Once the contestant has made his selection, the
contents of the 5 selected boxes are revealed to all parties. It is then known that the sum
in the contestants box is not one of these 5 sums. Round 1 ends with a cash o¤er from the
banker. If the contestant accepts the o¤er, the game ends and the contestant leaves the show
with the sum o¤ered by the banker. If the contestant rejects the o¤er, the game proceeds to
round 2.
Round 2 has broadly the same format as round 1, only this time the contestant is asked
to select 3 boxes from the remaining 16 held by the non-competing candidates. The contents
of these boxes are revealed and, once again, the round ends with an o¤er from the banker.
Again, if the contestant accepts the o¤er, the game ends and the contestant leaves the show
with the sum o¤ered by the banker. If the contestant rejects the o¤er, the game proceeds to
round 3.
The game continues in such a way for 6 rounds, with the contestant selecting boxes and
the banker making o¤ers at the end of each round. In each round the contestant selects
2Only the independent adjudicator knows the location of each sum.
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Table 2: A summary of the game-show format
Round No. of boxes remaining
at o¤er (including own)
O¤er accepted O¤er rejected
1 17 Game ends Go to round 2
2 14 Game ends Go to round 3
3 11 Game ends Go to round 4
4 8 Game ends Go to round 5
5 5 Game ends Go to round 6
6 2 Game ends Open your box
Table 3: Mean o¤ers and deal frequencies
Round Mean O¤er Standard Deviation # Deals
1 £ 3,488.26 £ 2,639.20 0
2 £ 5,926.09 £ 4,806.40 0
3 £ 8,436.57 £ 6,587.73 4
4 £ 12,316.24 £ 9,279.86 32
5 £ 17,308.68 £ 14,135.12 48
6 £ 15,127.43 £ 27,149.41 22
boxes from the non-competing candidates and the contents of his own box remain unknown
until the game is over. At the end of the nal round, when just 2 boxes remain, if the
contestant rejects the bankers o¤er, he is instructed to open his box to reveal his prize.
Table 2 describes the complete format of the game.
3 The Data
The data set comprises the relevant information (the lotteries, the bankers o¤er and the
contestantschoices) for each round of 129 episodes of the game-show aired in Great Britain.
Some useful summary statistics of the bankers o¤ers and the contestantsdecisions are given
in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that the bankers o¤ers are generally higher in the later rounds and that
there is a high variance in the o¤ers, particularly in round 6. Furthermore, the ratio of the
o¤er to the expected value of the remaining prizes increases in each round (See Figure 1).
The contestants decisions appear to be consistent with an improving o¤er function, with
virtually all deals being made in the second half of the game (rounds 4-6). In the next section
I perform a more rigorous analysis of the contestantschoices but by glancing over the data
it appears the contestants show some level of rationality. For example, Figure 1 suggests
contestants reject the low o¤ers and accept the high o¤ers.
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Figure 1: The mean ratio of the o¤er to the expected value of the remaining prizes
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Contestant earnings are generally very high but there is also a very high variance. The
mean winnings in the sample is £ 17,843 and the standard deviation is £ 17,357. Contestants
should therefore understand the signicance of their decisions. While there are very large
amounts of money to be won there is also the chance that they walk away with as little as a
penny (this happened twice in the sample). This setting makes the game ideal for modelling,
because one would expect the contestants to think carefully about their choices and, as a
result, better reveal their true preferences.
4 The Partial Approach - Deal or No Deal?
Existing studies generally treat the game-show as case study of how individuals make choices
under risk, taking the bankers o¤er as given and ignoring any strategic interaction between
the contestant and the banker. The bankers o¤er function is modelled empirically while
the contestantschoices are examined under the assumption that they are optimising and
from this the authors draw inference about the contestants risk attitudes. This is a partial
analysis of the game because it considers the optimising behaviour of only one of the players.
In Section 5 I propose a complete strategic model of the game, in which I determine both the
bankers optimal o¤er function, given a set of preferences, and the contestants best response,
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but rst I perform a partial analysis similar to that found in the majority of the literature.
I rst give details of some notation. Before the game begins the contestant chooses a
prize, b, from the initial set of prizes, X. The value of b is unknown to all parties but it is
known that it is uniformly distributed overX. The di¤erent rounds are indexed t = 1; 2; :::; 6.
In round t, the set of prizes remaining when the banker makes the o¤er is denoted by Xt
and the bankers o¤er is Yt. The number of elements in Xt is smaller for larger values of t
(see Table 2) but b 2 Xt for all values of t. I dene the straight lottery in round t, Lt, as
the simple lottery of choosing one of the remaining prizes with equal probability. That is,
Lt =

X1t ;
1
Kt
;X2t ;
1
Kt
; :::;XKtt ;
1
Kt

, where Xkt is the k
th element of Xt and Kt is the total
number of elements in Xt. I distinguish this lottery from the alternative gamble in round
t, Gt, which is dened as the lottery the contestant enters by playing No Deal in round t.
These lotteries are not necessarily the same and the relation between the two is discussed
below.
4.1 The contestants preferences
I assume the contestant is an expected utility maximiser whose preferences are represented by
the CRRA utility specication: U(x; r; w) = (x+w)
1 r 1
1 r , where r is the contestants coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion and w is the contestants initial wealth level. The contestants
optimisation problem in round t, when faced with the o¤er, Yt, is:
max
p2[0;1]
Vt = p:U(Yt) + (1  p):Et [Vt+1] , for t = 1; 2; :::; 6 (1)
where V7 = b (2)
where p 2 [0; 1] denotes the probability with which the contestant plays Deal. Equation 1
implies that the contestants best choice in round t depends on his beliefs about how the
banker will set o¤ers in future rounds. This is because by playing No Deal the contestant
not only takes one step closer to the end of the nal round when he can open his box, but it
also gives him the chance to decide on the round t+1 o¤er. If the contestant expects future
o¤ers to be high enough, he may value the lottery over future o¤ers above the round t o¤er.
This rational, forward looking play can be contrasted with that of a myopic contestant, who
does not take into account the value of future o¤ers. The myopic contestant only considers
the value of the straight lottery, Lt. His round t optimisation problem when faced with an
o¤er, Yt, can therefore be characterised as:
9
max
p2[0;1]
Vt = p:U(Yt) + (1  p):EU(Lt), for t = 1; 2; :::; 6 (3)
Whether the contestant is forward-looking or myopic, he will play Deal only if the o¤er
is at least as high as the certainty equivalent of the alternative gamble (p = 1 only if
Yt  CE (Gt; r)), he will play No Deal only if the o¤er is no higher than the certainty
equivalent (p = 0 only if Yt  CE (Gt; r)) and he will be indi¤erent between playing Deal and
No Deal when the o¤er is equal to the certainty equivalent ( p 2 [0; 1] only if Yt = CE (Gt; r)).
The crucial di¤erence is that the alternative gamble is dened di¤erently for the forward
looking and myopic contestants. When the contestant is forward looking the alternative
gamble, GFt , comprises the lottery of the future outcomes of the optimisation problem.
These outcomes may be future deals and they may be future straight lotteries, depending
on the bankers o¤er function. When the contestant is myopic the alternative gamble in
each round is the straight lottery, GMt = Lt. As this is not the result of any future optimal
behaviour, it follows that GFt  GMt .
The implication for estimation is that for a given set of prizes, the bankers o¤er and the
contestants decision, the forward looking model will produce a lower estimate of r than the
myopic model. Since GFt statewise weakly dominates G
M
t , the forward-looking contestant
must be at least as risk-averse as the myopic contestant if they are both to be indi¤erent
between playing Deal and No Deal.
4.2 The bankers o¤er function
In Section 5, when I model the problem as a 2-player game, the contestants beliefs are
fully rational and consistent with the bankers optimal o¤er in the perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium; but in this section I assume the contestant predicts the bankers o¤er with a
simple empirical model of the form:
Yt = t + tE[Xt] (4)
Other studies model the banker in a similar way. In Post et al (2006) the bankers o¤er
function is modelled as a proportion of the expected value of the remaining prizes. The
proportion in each round is completely determined by 2 parameters: the starting proportion
and the speed at which the proportion increases to 100% (the proportion is 100% in the nal
round because the nal round in that paper is when the contestant opens his box and he
wins whatever is inside). De Roos and Saridis (2006) regress the o¤er on the expected value
of the remaining prizes and the standard deviation of the remaining prizes to estimate the
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Table 4: The GLS estimate of the bankers o¤er function
Round
1 2 3 4 5 6
  2891
(630:9)
 2523
(865:6)
 1949
(704:5)
 606:5
(937:4)
314:5
(680:6)
 187:7
(681:9)
 0:249
(0:027)
0:326
(0:039)
0:399
(0:033)
0:444
(0:042)
0:566
(0:040)
0:771
(0:066)
R2 0:362 0:378 0:568 0:611 0:773 0:957
Observations 129 129 129 125 93 45
bankers o¤er function. The authors use natural logarithms of all variables to correct for the
likely heteroskedasticity and estimate a di¤erent set of parameters for each round. Mulino
et al (2006) take estimates of the ratio of the o¤er to the expected value of the remaining
prizes and separate the data not only by round but also by the size of the stakes.
Table 4 gives the results of the estimation of Equation 4 with White corrected robust
variance estimates. The constant term is signicant at the 5% level only in rounds 1-3 and
it is negative. Further, the estimate of t is greater the higher the value of t, suggesting
the banker becomes relatively more generous in later rounds. I refer to this observation
throughout the paper and, for clarity of exposition, I nd it helpful to call it an increasing
o¤er function. The explanatory power of the model is higher for later rounds and it is
especially high in round 6, suggesting there may be other things a¤ecting the bankers o¤er
in the early stages of the game. I come back to this in Section 6 when I discuss the bankers
objectives.
The results in Table 4 are used to determine the forward-looking contestants beliefs. For
each o¤er in the sample we can now determine the critical value of r for which the contestant
would be indi¤erent between playing Deal and No Deal.
4.3 Analysing the contestantschoices: a bounds approach
As stated previously, the contestant will play Deal only if the o¤er is at least as high as the
certainty equivalent of the alternative gamble, given the contestants preferences with respect
to risk. This rule can be reformulated in terms of r as follows. Denote by ert the value of
r for which U(Yt; ert; w) = U(Gt; ert; w), then the contestant will play Deal only if r  ert3.
The values of ert can then be used in conjunction with contestants choices (Deal or No Deal)
to determine upper and lower bounds on r for each contestant. If the contestant accepts
Y = CE(G; er0; w) then it must be that r  er0, and if he rejects Y = CE(G; er00; w) then it
3For a given straight lottery, Lt, the certainty equivalent of the alternative gamble, CE(Gt; r; w), is a
decreasing, continuous function of r, so, by the intermediate function theorem, there is a unique value of ert
that solves this equation.
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must be that r  er00. If the contestant never plays Deal then we cannot determine a lower
bound on r.
The choice information can be used to test for contestants mistakes. For example,
keeping the notation from the last paragraph, if there is a value of er00 for which er00 < er0, then
the contestant must have made inconsistent choices. This is because he accepted an o¤er
which is relatively less attractive than one he previously turned down. If his rejection of the
previous o¤er represents his true preferences then he should not have accepted the o¤er that
he did accept. On the other hand, if his acceptance of the o¤er represents his true preferences
then he should have accepted the previous o¤er, which he rejected. The contestant may also
make mistakes that are not observable to the experimenter. For example if he rejects all
o¤ers then we cannot construct a lower bound on r and no contradiction can be found. The
contestant may well be making mistake after mistake but it will not be picked up in the data.
Even if the contestant does play Deal it is possible that he may have made some mistakes
that do not produce the er00 < er0 contradiction. Therefore number of actual inconsistencies is
at least as large as the number of observed inconsistencies.
The CRRA formulation requires a value for the initial wealth value, w, to evaluate the
individuals utility level. This is not a straightforward choice. Estimates of the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion are sensitive to the assumption about the contestants wealth and
di¤erent studies use di¤erent values. For example, De Roos and Saridis (2006) estimate
their model using rst zero wealth and then a value equal to the average Australian annual
labour income. Post et al (2006) also consider the zero wealth scenario but use an estimate
of life-time wealth for the alternative, which amounts to approximately 10 times the median
household income. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) use all three of these measures (zero
wealth, annual labour income and life-time wealth measured as 10 times the annual labour
income) but concentrate on the annual labour income case to be consistent with previous
research4.
The choice of wealth parameter essentially depends on the assumption one makes about
the way the contestant brackets his choices. If the contestant considers his decisions in the
context of their e¤ect on life-time wealth, as a fully rational forward looking agent would,
then the appropriate measure is life-time wealth. A problem with this approach is that
individuals do not appear to bracket their choices so broadly. Read et al (1999) investigate
how individuals bracket their choices and nd evidence of narrow bracketing. They cite the
example of telephone wiring insurance given in Ciccheti and Dubin (1994, p173). In their
data set people pay 45 cents a month to insure themselves against an expected loss of 26
cents a month. Were individuals to consider this in the context of their life-time consumption
4The authors cite Gertner (1993) and Cohen and Einav (2005) on this point.
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Table 5: The results of the bounds estimate of r
Scenario Bound Mean st. dev Min Max Inconsistencies
Myopic, Upper 0:467 0:145 0 0:774 26 (24:53%)
w = 0 Lower 0:369 0:195  0:213 1:080
Myopic, Upper 0:639 0:245 0 1:849 31 (29:25%)
w = 2000 Lower 0:491 0:281  0:251 1:522
Dynamic, Upper 1:084 0:827 0 3:790 20 (18:87%)
w = 0 Lower 0:546 0:498  0:213 3:264
Dynamic, Upper 1:191 0:897 0:000 4:303 22 (20:75%)
w = 2000 Lower 0:635 0:521  0:251 3:484
this would be an extremely high level of risk-aversion. The fact that individuals purchase
insurance at this rate seems to imply that these consumers bracket their choices in a much
narrower time-frame.
Ideally the wealth parameter would be estimated but I do not do this here. I consider
2 scenarios: in the rst scenario I set w = 0 and in the second I set w = $20005. Thus I
consider the alternative behavioural assumptions that individuals 1) do not integrate wealth
into the decision making process; and 2) bracket their choices in a monthly time-period.
Table 5 presents summary statistics on the upper and lower bounds on r under both
the myopic and the dynamic contestant frameworks. It also details how many contestants
behaved inconsistently.
As expected, the estimates of r are higher when the contestant is forward looking and
higher when he integrates his wealth into the decision-making. Lying in the range of 0:4 1:2,
these estimates are comparable to the results of similar studies (see Section 1). The vari-
ance in the bounds is also relatively high, indicating there is some degree of heterogeneity
in contestants risk attitudes. The number of inconsistencies in each scenario suggests the
contestant makes mistakes with a very high frequency. It also suggests the contestants be-
haviour is best characterised by the dynamic framework and that he does not integrate wealth
into his decision-making, as this combination gives the lowest number of inconsistencies.
4.4 A logit model of the contestants behaviour
I estimate a logit model of the contestantsbehaviour to obtain point estimates of the average
level of risk aversion. I assume contestants sometimes make mistakes when choosing between
Deal and No Deal and that the contestants propensity to make a mistake depends on how
5This is an estimate of the monthly earnings for the average contestant, based on the ONS estimate of
the average household income in 2003-04.
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close the o¤er is to the contestants certainty equivalent6. In particular I estimate a logit
model in which contestant i plays Deal in round t with the following probability:
prob(Deali;t) =
e(ri ert)
1 + e(ri ert) (5)
This expression says that the closer to ri is the implied level of risk aversion, ert, the more
likely is the contestant to play Deal. An advantage of using the implied values of r to analyse
contestantschoices rather than actual consumption values is that there are no limits on the
values r can take. The same is not true for consumption values, which are constrained to be
non-negative.
 measures the contestants ability to rationally decide between Deal and No Deal. I
call this the coe¢ cient of discernment. If  > 0, the contestant shows some understanding
of when he should play Deal or No Deal and the higher is the value of , the better is the
contestant at deciding what to do. As  ! 1 the contestant is able to decide perfectly
rationally - he will make the right decision with certainty no matter how close the o¤er is to
the certainty equivalent. If  = 0, the contestant makes his choices completely randomly and
will play either Deal or No Deal with probability 1
2
regardless of the lottery or the o¤er. If 
< 0, the contestant has erroneous beliefs about when he should play Deal. As jj gets bigger
he acts on these erroneous beliefs more condently, making wrong decisions more often, and
as jj ! 1 he makes the wrong decision every time is made an o¤er7.
Allowing for heterogeneous risk attitudes (i.e. ri = r+ i, where E[i] = 0 and var[vi] =
2), the appropriate procedure for the estimation of Equation 5 is a random e¤ects logit
model. The results are presented in Table 6.
Because of problems with the data the random e¤ects logit model cannot be estimated
for each scenario using all the data8. So in order to obtain results for all scenarios, I estimate
the random e¤ects logit model using data only from rounds 5 and 6. This makes use of
choice data from 93 out of the original 129 contestants.
As expected, the estimates of r in Table 6 are higher when the contestant is dynamic
or integrates wealth into the decision problem. Under the assumption that the contestant
does not integrate wealth into the decision problem, the empirical model (with a forward
6De Roos and Saridis (p16) and Mulino et al (p22) consider similar ways to estimate the contestants
preferences using the idea that a contestants decision is a noisy representation of his true preferences (see
Hey and Orme (1994)). This form of estimation is usually performed with utilities but I use the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion as the numeraire. This is not a large departure from the norm but it improves the
tractability of this model.
7Clearly, when the o¤er is equal to the certainty equivalent there is no "wrong decision", so this is the
only exception.
8The estimation procedure could not nd a concave region when the estimation is performed with the
whole data set for the myopic individual.
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Table 6: The results of the logit model
r 2 
Myopic, w = 0 0:484
(0:187)
0:477
(0:614)
3:954
(1:060)
Myopic, w = 2000 0:766
(0:214)
0
(0:387)
3:096
(0:616)
Dynamic, w = 0 0:636
(0:280)
1:226
(0:386)
3:615
(0:862)
Dynamic, w = 2000 0:872
(0:242)
0
(0:572)
2:542
(0:502)
looking contestant) produces a mean estimate of r in the region of 0.6 and a high degree of
heterogeneity. This compares closely to the estimates from other studies of Deal or No Deal
under the same assumption of zero wealth (e.g. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), 0.5; De Roos
and Saridis (2006), 0.66; and Post et al (2006), 1.15). It also compares well with estimates
from studies of other game-shows (e.g. Beetsma and Schotman (2001), 0.42).
Using the average monthly income as the wealth parameter gives an estimate in the
region of 0.9 but no signicant heterogeneity in risk attitudes. No other studies use this
wealth level, but, as one would expect, this estimate is higher than under the assumption of
zero wealth and lower than estimates from other studies that assume a wealth parameter of
annual or life-time wealth.
The coe¢ cient of discernment (measured by ) appears to be relatively low and even large
deviations from the contestants critical value yield fairly uncertain actions. For example,
suppose that in the nal round the two remaining prizes are £ 1 and £ 1000. The estimate
of r in Table 6 indicates that the critical value for the forward looking contestant who does
not integrate wealth into his decision problem values is £ 184.43. If the banker were to o¤er
this sum, the contestant would play deal with a 50% probability. But if the banker were to
o¤er £ 260.84, an increase of over 80%, the probability that the contestant would accept is
only 61%. This suggests that contestantschoices are fairly insensitive to large deviations
from the critical value.
5 The Game of Incomplete Information
Until now the banker has played a passive role in the modelling, with any strategic interaction
with the contestant being ignored. In this section I present a model of the game-show that
treats both the contestant and the banker as strategic players. I rst set up the problem as
a formal game and then look at the properties of the equilibrium solution. I show that one
of these properties is an increasing o¤er function and thus provide a theoretical basis to the
empirical model.
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5.1 Strategies
The bankers strategy space in each (realised) round is the positive real line. In round t he
makes an o¤er to the contestant, Yt, where Yt 2 R + +. The contestants strategy space in
each round is the set of possible responses to the bankers o¤er. In each round he can play
either Deal (D) or No Deal (ND).
5.2 Payo¤s
The contestants preferences were discussed in Section 4. I assume the contestant is forward
looking so his optimisation problem is described by Equation 1. The banker is risk-neutral
and cares only about his losses. In each round he uses all information available to him to
minimise the expected payout over the rest of the game. This is by no means the most likely
representation of the bankers preferences but it is the base case and I will show that it is
enough to produce an increasing o¤er function in equilibrium. I discuss alternative dimen-
sions to the bankers preferences and the e¤ect these additions may have on the equilibrium
o¤ers in Section 6
5.3 Information
The structure of the game and the bankers preferences are common knowledge but there is
an informational asymmetry with respect to the contestants preferences. Both players know
that the contestant is a risk-averse utility-maximiser whose preferences are represented by
the CRRA specication, but only the contestant knows the value of r. Although the banker
does not know the precise value of r for each contestant, he has a set of a priori beliefs
about the distribution of r. These beliefs are characterised by the cumulative distribution
function, F (r), which is is continuous and everywhere di¤erentiable, and the corresponding
probability density function, f(r).
5.4 Solving the game
The game is solved by backward induction and the relevant solution concept is the perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). It species a strategy prole and a set of beliefs such that
the strategies are sequentially rational given the set of beliefs and the beliefs are consistent,
wherever possible, given the strategy prole.
The contestants best response to the bankers o¤er was derived in Section 4 so I now
focus on the bankers best o¤er. Just as the contestants best response depends on the
expectations of the bankers future o¤ers, so does the bankers best o¤er depend on the
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expectations of the contestants reply. For ease of computation I assume that the contestant
always plays Deal when he is indi¤erent between Deal and No Deal9. The contestants
decision rule can therefore be characterised as follows: Accept Yt (play Deal in round t) if
and only if Yt  CE(Gt; r).
After each round the banker learns something about the contestants type from the
contestants decision to play Deal or No Deal and he uses Bayes Rule to rationally update
his beliefs for the next round. Since the game ends after the contestant has played Deal, the
information is only useful when the contestant has played No Deal. CE(Gt; r) is decreasing
in r so the banker knows that for a type r0 and o¤er Y 0, such that r0 would accept Y 0, it
must be that any type r00, such that r00  r0, would also accept Y 0. So when the banker
updates his beliefs, he truncates the top end of the belief set, leaving the bottom end intact.
Again, denote by rt the type that is indi¤erent between playing Deal and No Deal when
o¤ered Yt in round t and call this type the marginal type. Then the bankers updated beliefs
in round t are that r is drawn from the truncated distribution over [ 1; rt 1] characterised
by ft(r) = f (r j r < rt 1) 10. By setting no lower bound on the value of r I allow for
the possibility that contestants are risk-loving. Although it is conventionally assumed that
individuals are risk-averse, there is no theoretical reason why this has to be the case. Indeed
it has long been established that individuals often show risk-loving behaviour when they
gamble (see, for example, Friedman and Savage, 1948, pp285-86).
We can also use the above denition of the marginal type to rene the decision rule for
type r: Accept Yt(rt) (play Deal in round t) if and only if r  rt11.
The bankers problem is to choose the o¤er that minimises the expected pay-out over the
rest of the game, but it is useful to think of the problem as choosing which type to make
indi¤erent between playing Deal or No Deal. Once this choice has been made, the o¤er is
simply the certainty equivalent pertaining to the alternative gamble, Gt, for that type. The
bankers round t optimisation problem can therefore be written as:
9The contestant is indi¤erent between Deal and No Deal when the o¤er is equal to the certainty equivalent,
but if the o¤er is above the threshold by only a small amount, , the contestant will accept. Since the bankers
strategy space is continuous,  can be innitesimally small and the contestant will still accept. Therefore
the assumption that the contestant accepts when he is indi¤erent is not particularly contentious.
10Note that f1(r) = f(r).
11This is analagous to the decision rule in Section 4.
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min
rt2[ 1;rt 1]
t = Et [t+1] Ft(rt) + Yt (rt) (1  Ft(rt)) (6)
for t = 1; 2; :::; 6
where 7 = b
s.t. Yt(rt) = CE (Gt; rt) (7)
t (rt) is at for values of rt  rt 1, since prob (Deal) = 0 and t = Et [t+1 j rt 1] in
this range. When the banker sets the o¤er so that prob (Deal) = 0, I assume he sets the
highest o¤er that achieves this. This is consistent with the idea that contestants should face
non-trivial decisions and that o¤ers should be perceived to be reasonable (see Section 6).
Therefore I assume that if the banker wants there to be a deal with zero probability he sets
Yt (rt) = Yt (rt 1) and so the domain of the round t optimisation problem is [ 1; rt 1].
In round 6 the alternative gamble is the straight lottery over the 2 remaining boxes
(G6 = L6). The bankers o¤er is therefore the certainty equivalent of the straight lottery for
the marginal type and the marginal type is chosen so as to solve the following problem:
min
r6
6 = E6 [b] F6(r6) + CE (L6; r6) (1  F6(r6)) (8)
Proposition 1 The solution to the round 6 optimisation problem is always such that r6  0
if there is to be a non-zero probability of a deal in round 6.
Proof. The rst order condition is:
f6(r6) (E6 [b]  CE (L6; r6)) + (1  F6(r6)) d
dr6
CE (L6; r6) = 0 (9)
We also know that d
dr6
CE (L6; r6) < 0 and CE (L6; 0) = E6 [b]. Now suppose that r6 < 0.
Then Equation 9 implies that (1  F6(r6)) < 0. This is impossible, so unless f6(r6) =
(1  F6(r6)) = 0 it must be that r6  0.
Proposition 2 If r5 > 0, the solution to the round 6 optimisation problem is such that
0 < r6 < r5.
Proof. Suppose r6 = r5. Then E6 [b] = CE (L6; r6) = CE (L6; r5) which implies that r5 = 0.
But r5 > 0 so it cannot be that r6 = r5. Thus as long as r5 > 0, r6 < r5. Now, we have
already ruled out the possibility that r6 < 0 but suppose that r6 = 0. Then (1  F6(r6)) = 0.
But r5 > r6 so F6(r6) < 0. Thus r6 > 0 and so 0 < r6 < r5.
So in round 6, the banker will always update his beliefs if they include any risk-averse
types. If there are no risk averse types the banker cannot benet from paying the contestant
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to bear the risk because the price is too high. At that price the banker prefers the contestant
to take the gamble and open his own box. The lowest type the banker is willing to insure is
r = 0. If the starting beliefs are that all types are risk-loving (i.e. r5 < 0), then the bankers
o¤er is such that there is a zero probability of a deal (i.e. r6 = r5).
In round 5 the o¤er is set so that types r > r5 play Deal (this follows from the denition
of r5 and the rened contestant decision rule). We know that types r > r5 would also play
Deal in round 6 were they given the choice, since r6  r5 < r, so the alternative gamble
for the types around the round 5 marginal type is the lottery over round 6 o¤ers, given
the choice of r5. Therefore the round 5 o¤er that implements the round 6 belief set is the
certainty equivalent of the lottery over round 6 o¤ers for type r5.
The banker chooses r5 to solve the following problem:
min
r5
5 = E5 [6] F5(r) + CE (G5; r5) (1  F5(r)) (10)
Proposition 3 If r4 > 0, the solution to the round 5 optimisation problem is such that
0 < r5 < r4.
Proof. Suppose r5  0. In round 6 the o¤er will be set so that there is a zero probability
of a deal. This is because CE (L6; r)  E6 [b] for r  r5. This implies that E5 [6] = E5 [b].
It also implies that the alternative gamble for the marginal type in round 5 is the straight
lottery, L5, because the marginal type would play No Deal in round 6, and since r5  0,
Y5 = CE (L5; r5)  E5 [b]. Therefore when r5  0 , 5(r5)  E5 [b]. But 5(r4) = E5 [b]
and 5(r4 + ) < E5 [b] for small negative values of  so r5  0 cannot be a solution to the
optimisation problem. Therefore r5 > 0.
To show that r5 < r4 we need to show that CE (G5; r4) < E5 [6]. If CE (G5; r4) < E5 [6]
then r5 = r4 cannot be a solution to Equation 10 because F5(r4) = 1. Now suppose r5 = r4.
Then in round 6 the o¤er will be at least as high as the certainty equivalent for type r4,
Y6  CE (L6; r4). This implies that 6  CE (L6; r4) since CE (L6; r4) < E6 [b]. Taking
expectations from round 5, it follows that E5 [Y6]  E5 [6]. Type r4 will accept the o¤er in
round 6 so G5 is the lottery over round 6 o¤ers. Since r4 > 0, it must be that E5 [Y6] >
CE (G5; r4), and so it must be that E5 [6] > CE (G5; r4). Therefore r5 = r4 cannot be a
solution to Equation 10. Therefore r5 must be such that 0 < r5 < r4.
In rounds 1-4 the optimal o¤er is determined in a similar way to round 5. In round t
the alternative gamble for the marginal type, rt, is the lottery over the round t + 1 o¤ers,
given the choice of rt, and the o¤er is chosen so as to solve Equation (6). In each round
the banker chooses a belief set for the next round and sets the o¤er accordingly. If the
contestant plays No Deal then the game proceeds to the next round and some more prizes
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Figure 2: The equilibrium strategies for all contestant types
ND6 D6 D5 D4 D3 D2 D1
r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r10
are eliminated. With the belief set he inherited from the previous round and the new set of
prizes, the banker again chooses a belief set for the next round and sets the o¤er accordingly.
The game continues until the contestant plays Deal or reaches the end of round 6.
The PBNE concept requires that the strategies be sequentially rational given the belief
system and that the belief system be consistent with the strategy prole wherever possible.
This means that in round t if the banker wants to implement a belief, rt+1, then his round
t o¤er has to reect both future optimal o¤ers and future optimal contestant decision rules
in rounds t + 1 and beyond. The possible round t + 1 o¤ers therefore contain information
about optimal behaviour along all possible paths all the way to the end of the game.
The proposition that 0 < rt < rt 1 if rt 1 > 0 can be proved for rounds 1-4 in a similar
way as for round 5 (see the Appendix). This means that unless the a priori distribution
of types, F , species that all contestants are risk-loving with unit probability, then rt > 0
for t = 1; 2; :::6. If all types in the support of F for which f (r) > 0 are risk loving then
the banker may set rt < 0 but only on the condition that Ft (rt) = 1 and ft (rt) = 0 (i.e.
only if the contestant will denitely not accept the o¤er). Such games are not interesting
because there will never be any deals so from here on I make the assumption that F (0) < 1
(i.e. the bankers a priori beliefs are such that the contestant is risk averse with a positive
probability).
Under this assumption, the banker will set the o¤ers so that in each round there is a
positive probability of a deal. The banker only benets from paying the contestant to leave
the game if the contestant is risk-averse so all o¤ers are targeted at risk-averse types.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium strategy for all types of contestant. The scale repre-
sents the distribution of types and the location of the marginal types, rt, for each round, t
and above the scale are the equilibrium strategies for each type. The diagram species what
each possible type would do For example, if r is such that r4 < r < r3, he will play No
Deal in rounds 1-3 and then play Deal in round 4. The locations of the marginal types are
not xed. They are derived from the bankers optimisation problem so they depend on the
prizes that are eliminated in that round and the locations of the marginal types from the
previous rounds.
The contestant has a unique equilibrium strategy for a given sequence of prize eliminations
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and this strategy depends on the contestants type. The least risk averse contestants (r < r6)
will never play Deal in equilibrium because the bankers o¤ers are always too low, given their
preferences. The most risk averse contestants (r1 < r), on the other hand, will always play
Deal in the 1st round. Were they to participate in the later rounds they would also play
Deal, but they are not prepared to take the risk of playing No Deal in the 1st round to win
themselves the possibility of a better o¤er in future rounds. Between these ranges are types
who are willing to gamble to some extent but who will eventually accept an o¤er.
5.5 The signicance of the informational asymmetry
The informational asymmetry gives the contestant an advantage over the banker relative
to the complete information scenario. Under complete information the contestant is no
better o¤ if he accepts the bankers o¤er than if he were playing the straight lottery (this is
because U (Yt) = U (Lt)) but in the game of incomplete information, with the exception of
the marginal type in round 6, any type that is willing to accept an o¤er is strictly better o¤
than if he were playing the straight lottery. The surplus is the result of 2 e¤ects.
First, since the round t o¤er is set so as to make type rt indi¤erent between Deal and No
Deal, types rt < r < rt 1 are being paid more than they need to be to leave the game. When
type r > rt plays Deal in round t he earns rent  t(r) for being pooled with lower types.
 t(r) = CE (Lt; rt)  CE (Lt; r) (11)
Second, even the marginal types in rounds 1-5 are better o¤ than in the game of complete
information. To see why, consider the following. If a contestant accepts a deal then he must
value the sure sum of money at least as highly as the lottery over future o¤ers. That is,
if type r accepts Yt for t = 1; 2; :::; 5 then it must be that U (Yt; r)  Et [U (Yt+ )] for all
 = 1; 2; ::: (6  t). Now we already know that 0 < rt < rt 1 if rt 1 > 0, so it follows
that Y6 = CE (L6; r6) > CE (L6; rt), and so U (Y6; rt) > E6 [U (b; rt)]. This implies that
Et [U (Y6; rt)] > Et [U (b; rt)], so in round t the contestant strictly prefers the lottery over
round 6 o¤ers to Lt. But U (Yt; r)  Et [U (Yt+ )] for all  = 1; 2; :::; 6   t, so it must be
that Yt > CE (Lt; rt). Therefore the marginal type in rounds 1-5 of the game of incomplete
information earns more than the contestant in the game of complete information. The
di¤erence is the rent the marginal type earns because of the informational asymmetry, t.
t = Yt   CE (Lt; rt) (12)
While t > 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; 5, the marginal type in round 6 earns no informational rent
(6 = 0) . This is because there are no future o¤ers to consider and so there is no incentive
21
for the contestant to "act less risk-averse". The alternative gamble is the straight lottery,
G6 = L6, and the marginal type, r6, is indi¤erent between accepting Y6 and entering the
straight lottery.
The total rent earned by type r who plays Deal in round t is:
RENT = t +  t(r) (13)
As noted, rent accrues only to types r > r6. Types r < r6 receive zero rent because they do
not play Deal and as such cannot benet from the premia on the o¤ers (the o¤ers are still
too low for these types).
Like the forward-looking contestant in Section 4, the contestant realises that there is
value to staying in the game. He knows that the banker will update his beliefs in the
next round and set a relatively higher o¤er than in the current round. For some types this
is enough to play No Deal even though the o¤er is above the certainty equivalent of the
straight lottery. By playing No Deal in the current round they pool themselves with lower
types and receive a relatively high o¤er in the next round. Unlike the types that play Deal,
these types are prepared to bear the risk of the elimination of high value prizes to make
themselves indistinguishable from the lower types. For this reason the banker has to pay the
marginal type more than the certainty equivalent of the straight lottery to make him leave
the game.
For the contestant to make gains the banker has to make losses above what he pays out
in the game of complete information. The expected excess payment the banker expects to
make in round t, given rt 1 is:
Et [Pt] =
rt 1Z
rt
(t +  t (r)) ft (r) dr (14)
Since t +  t(r)  0 for all values r and t +  t(r) > 0 for some values r, the expected
excess payment is strictly positive in each round.
6 The Banker
Up to this point I have considered a simple representation of the bankers preferences and
shown that when the banker is uncertain about the contestants type the equilibrium o¤er
becomes relatively more generous with each round. In this section I look at what other
factors may motivate the banker and what e¤ects they may have on the o¤er.
It is the authors understanding that the banker is an articial personality thought up
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by the producers of the show to give a voice to the o¤er decision, and as such his preferences
represent the preferences of the producers. The question then is: what are the producers
objectives? The simple answer o¤ered here is ratings and cost minimisation: the producers
try to make the show as entertaining as possible to achieve the best possible ratings while
keeping the costs down where possible. From a starting point of cost-minimisation the banker
can alter the o¤er to increase or decrease the likelihood of a deal, depending on how exciting
the game is shaping up to be. If the game contains exciting features and the producers
want the contestant to continue then the o¤er might be set slightly lower so as to decrease
the likelihood of a deal. On the other hand, if the game does not look interesting then the
banker may increase the o¤er slightly to increase the chance of a deal. So when is the game
exciting?
First of all, the game is only exciting as long as the contestant has a chance of winning a
large sum of money and it is more exciting the riskier the outcomes (i.e. when there is both
the possibility of large gains and the possibility of only small gains). When outcomes are
risky the contestants choices have greater signicance. Thus the producers generally prefer
games with high expected earnings coupled with high variance.
The style of the individual game also depends on the order of prize elimination. 2 common
styles that make for good entertainment are the comeback and the crash. A comeback is
what happens when a contestant experiences early losses (i.e. many of the high value prizes
are eliminated) but returns to receive high o¤ers at the end of the game; and a crash is
what happens when a contestant makes early gains (i.e. few of the high value prizes are
eliminated) but subsequently loses a strong position with a sequence of high value prize
eliminations. When the banker spots the possibility of a comeback he may decide to keep
o¤ers relatively low, encouraging the contestant to build some hope. In this case lower o¤ers
magnify the perception of a comeback. When the banker spots the possibility of a crash
the e¤ect is not so clear. On the one hand he wants the contestant to continue (lower o¤ers
achieve this), but on the other hand he wants the crash to appear as big as possible (higher
o¤ers achieve this).
In general, the game is most exciting in rounds 4, 5 and 6. This is when the decision
problem becomes relatively easy to understand and it is when the style of the game has
been formed (e.g. it may be a comeback, a crash or a high variance game). The contestant
has also usually managed to build a rapport with the audience by this stage. The banker
may therefore be willing to give up cost-minisiation in the early rounds to see the contestant
progress to the latter stages.
Finally, the essence of the game is the contestants decision problem when he is o¤ered a
deal. If this is a trivial problem then the game cannot be exciting. The o¤ers should therefore
23
be somewhere in the range where a reasonable person may have di¢ culty deciding what to
do. This is for the most part ensured by the bankers preference for cost-minimisation, but
should the banker wish all types to play No Deal, then this condition rules out the possibility
of o¤ers such as £ 012.
6.1 Framing e¤ects
On a theoretical level, the game is fairly straightforward for the contestant. The only mean-
ingful choice he has to make is whether to play Deal or No Deal at the end of each round.
But the simplicity of the game is misrepresented by the hosts theatrical performances. The
host encourages contestants and viewers to believe there is much more to the game than
there is and he puts emphasis on irrelevant aspects of the game. Here I look at the way
the host frames the problem so as to get a better understanding of what the producers are
trying to achieve. From this I hope to draw some conclusions about the bankers objectives.
The host gives the impression that the contestants objective should be to "beat the
banker". I take the meaning of this to be either:
 accepting an o¤er which is both higher than any other o¤er and higher than the sum
hidden inside ones own box; or
 going all the way and nding that the sum inside ones own box is higher than any
previous o¤er.
There are a couple of things to mention here. First, framing the problem in this way in-
dicates that there is a complex strategic relationship between the contestant and the banker,
that winning large sums can be achieved by skill and not chance. This notion is further
strengthened by the bankers many comments about how well he thinks the contestant is
playing. Second, it encourages ex post evaluations of the game the correctness of a decision
cannot be determined without knowledge of what is contained in the contestants box, which
is only attained at the very end of the game. This is not in the spirit of EUT, which uses
an ex ante method of evaluation. Indeed, to an expected utility maximiser, these ex post
evaluations are meaningless. The implication may be that one should apply signicance to
alternative theories of choice, such as regret theory (Bell (1982), Loomes & Sugden (1982))
and disappointment theory (Loomes and Sugden (1986)).
The host also uses certain adjectives to describe contestants decisions. Decisions to play
No Deal are usually framed positively with words such as "bravery" and "courage". The
12This thinking is applied in Section 5
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banker apparently has "respect" for some players and he is apparently able to recognise an
"intelligent" player. On the other hand, decisions to play Deal are often met with disapproval.
There is clearly pressure on the contestant to play No Deal and the possibility that it may
take some courage to play Deal is generally ignored. In the ex post evaluation, terms such as
"catastrophe" and "biggest mistake of your life" are not uncommon, regardless of whether
ex ante the contestant made the right decision.
These are some observations that give clues about how the banker may approach the game
strategically. In Section 5 I used the most basic characterisation of the bankers preferences
to model the game - expected cost minimisation. While this may not be the most precise
description of the bankers preferences it forms the base case for the model to which future
formulations can be compared and I showed that when there is type-uncertainty this base
case assumption alone is enough to produce an increasing o¤er function.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I characterise the contestant and the banker as strategic players in a dynamic
game and show that if there is noise in the bankers beliefs about the contestants prefer-
ences then a preference for cost-minimisation alone is enough to produce an increasing o¤er
function. I use this result to give theoretical backing to an empirical model of the banker
which species a round t o¤er that is a linear function of the expected value of the remaining
set of prizes in round t.
The empirical model of the banker with a forward looking contestant provides an approx-
imation of the playersbehaviour in equilibrium, so estimates of the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion based on this model can be regarded as approximations of the results of the fully
specied game. Estimating the actual values is much more demanding because it involves
solving out the entire game and nding the range of values that best ts the data.
Under the assumption that the contestant does not integrate wealth into the decision
problem, the empirical model produces a mean estimate of r in the region of 0.6 with a
high degree of heterogeneity. This is consistent with estimates from the "Deal or No Deal?"
and other game-show literature. Using the average monthly income as the wealth parameter
obtains an estimate in the region of 0.9 but no signicant heterogeneity in risk attitudes.
It should be noted that these estimates of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion are based
on the choices of individuals who may not be representative of the general public. It is the
opinion of this author that the screening process favours the less risk-averse individuals (a
contestant who rejects relatively high o¤ers is generally more entertaining than a contestant
who accepts relatively low o¤ers) so the estimates should be regarded as downwardly biased
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estimates of the populations risk attitudes.
This claim seems plausible when one compares the estimates of the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion to gures from the broader literature, although estimates vary considerably.
Some studies produce values far higher than the estimates discussed here (e.g. Mehra and
Prescott (1985), Blake (1996), Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Sydnor (2005)), while a few
produce values in the same range (e.g. Szpiro (1986) and Chetty (2006)). In general,
estimates that use nance data tend to be much higher, while Chetty (2006), which uses
evidence of labour supply elasticities, is notable because it produces an estimate roughly
equal to unity.
The estimates of the coe¢ cient of discernment are relatively low suggesting that con-
testants have a hard time choosing whether or not to accept the bankers o¤er, even when
the o¤er is not close to the contestants threshold value. In addition, the bounds approach
shows that a large proportion of contestants make inconsistent choices. These results can
be interpreted in one of two ways. On the one hand they can be taken to indicate that
contestants su¤er from cognitive limitations. On the other, they can be taken to indicate
that EUT under the CRRA specication is not an appropriate framework with which to
model individual choice.
The game presented in this paper is the base-case scenario in which the banker is char-
acterised as an expected cost-minimiser. The bankers preferences are likely to be more
sophisticated and some possible modications are discussed in Section 6. Modelling these
improvements more formally would be a useful topic of future research. Another useful topic
would be the estimation of the wealth parameter in the CRRA utility function, which would
shed light on how broadly individuals bracket their choices. Moreover, work that focuses
on nding a way to solve for the whole game of incomplete information would provide the
next step towards estimating a model in which the bankers beliefs are parameterised and
estimated alongside the contestants preferences.
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A Appendix
The proof from Section 5:
Proposition 4 If rt 1 > 0, the solution to the round t optimisation problem is such that
0 < rt < rt 1.
I split the proposition into 2 parts, Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. The proofs of these
propositions together form the proof for Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 If rt 1 > 0, the solution to the round t optimisation problem is such that
rt < rt 1.
Proof. In order to prove Proposition 5 we need to show that:
Et [t+1] > CE (Gt; rt 1) (Condition 1)
If this holds then rt = rt 1 cannot be a solution to Equation 6 because t (rt) < t (rt 1 + )
for small negative values of . Therefore it must be that rt < rt 1.
I use induction to prove Condition 1 for all values of t. I rst show that it holds for t = 6
and then show that if it holds for t = T then it must also hold for t = T   1:
The proof for t = 6 can be found in Proposition 2.
Now suppose Condition 1 holds for t = T . That is ET [T+1] > CE (GT ; rT 1). In
round T the o¤er the banker sets when he wants to ensure a zero probability of a deal is
CE (GT ; rT 1) and it is the lowest round T o¤er in the feasible set, given rT 1 and XT (see
Section 5). Since CE (GT ; rT 1) < ET [T+1] Equation 6 implies that T  CE (GT ; rT 1).
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Taking expectations from round T   1, it follows that ET 1 [T ]  ET 1 [CE (GT ; rT 1)].
But rT 1 > 0, so ET 1 [CE (GT ; rT 1)] > CE (GT 1; rT 1). Therefore
ET 1 [T ] > CE (GT 1; rT 1)  CE (GT 1; rT 2)
This gives the following result:
Et [T+1] > CE (GT ; rT 1) =) ET 1 [T ] > CE (GT 1; rT 2)
That is, if Condition 1 holds for t = T then it must also hold for t = T  1. But if Condition
1 holds for t = T   1 then it must also hold for t = T   2. So if Condition 1 holds for t = T
it holds for t = 1; 2; ::; T .
But we know that Condition 1 holds for t = 6 so it must hold for t = 1; 2; ::; 6. Thus
if rt 1 > 0, the solution to the round t optimisation problem is such that rt < rt 1 for all
rounds, t = 1; 2; ::; 6.
Proposition 6 If rt 1 > 0, the solution to the round t optimisation problem is such that
rt > 0.
Proof. Suppose rt  0. Since Gt  Lt it must be that: Yt = CE (Gt; rt)  CE (Lt; rt) 
Et [b]. Only types r < rt will reject this o¤er. The round t value function must then be such
that t  Et [b].
Now, from Propostion 2 we know that 0 < r6 < r5 and 6 < E6 [b] when r5 > 0 and that
r6  0 and 6 = E6 [b] when r5  0. Since Y5(r5) < E5 [b] and E5 [6] < E5 [b] for r5 > 0
it must be that 5 (r5) < E5 [b] for r5 > 0. Therefore r5  0 cannot solve Equation 10 as
it gives 5  E5 [b] and so it must be that r5 > 0. Using the same argument in round 4,
E4 [5] < E4 [b] for r4  0 and so the solution to the round 4 optimisation problem must
be such that r4 > 0. This argument can be extended back to round 1 to prove the general
result for all rounds, t = 1; 2; :::; T .
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